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Abstract-_Romania   bears   the   marks   of   the   country’s 
former land policies : 36% of the active population is involved 
in agricultural activity. In addition, the agricultural land is 
characterized by excessive land fragmentation (approximately 
2 ha per holding). In the context of a strong will to stimulate 
the   land   market   and   to   encourage   competitiveness   by 
modernizing   the   production   systems,   the   Ministry   of 
Agriculture in 2005 decided to implement a specific policy : the 
life annuity subsidy. This consists in a subsidy calculated 
according to the surface of the agricultural land, paid to people 
over   62   years   old   who   commit   themselves   to   stopping 
agricultural activity. This paper analyses the opportunity for 
farmers to participate in this program using a Net Present 
Value to test the financial incentive of the measure under 
renting or selling contracts. We based our analysis on data 
concerning the land market and profitability from a survey 
conducted in the Mures region in the summer of 2007 and on 
land price figures. We show that in this specific context of 
grain and land prices, the amount of the subsidy is not high 
enough   to   make   the   program   attractive   but   comforts 
landowners who are already engaged in renting contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION
Almost  20  years   after the revolution,  the so  called 
“transition” period in Romania has not yet ended. The land 
retrocession process implemented in 1990 has been blamed 
for causing a delay in the agricultural sector modernization. 
Today, the land is split into a multitude of small parcels and 
36% of the active population still work in agriculture (as 
opposed to an average of 15% in the other New Members 
States(NMS)   of   European   Union).   On   one   hand,   this 
retrocession participates in the economic absorption of the 
social   consequences   of   the   post-communist   transition 
(Pouliquen [1]). On the other hand, this patchwork of small 
farms is perceived as a factor slowing down improvement in 
Romanian agriculture but also more generally as an obstacle 
to a global economic revival (Alexandri and al., [2]).
The optimal size of agricultural holdings is a source of 
debate, notably in terms of the possibility of return to scale 
in agriculture (Boussard, [3]). There have been numerous 
studies published on option choices in terms of leasing and 
tenancy contracts, but there are fewer published studies on 
options between individual farming, selling or leasing the 
land.
This paper is a part of a larger analysis of the life annuity 
program, a national subsidy implemented in Romania in 
2005. We focus here on the major objective of the program : 
land market stimulation, through financial opportunity for 
landowners to adhere to the program. 
We studied the policy globally using a comprehensive 
approach,   notably   through   a   field   survey   and   crossed 
interviews with diverse stakeholders of the policy. In this 
paper, we focus on the financial interest calculation for a 
landowner   to   adhere   to   the   program,   using   some 
assumptions of the peasant economy defined by Chayanov 
[4].  Does   the   amount   of   the   life   annuity   change   the 
preferences for leaving the agricultural activity of farming 
individually in order to lease or sell the land, or change the 
preference from leasing to selling the land?
A. Description of the Farm structure and the role of land 
tenancy or land purchase in land reconfiguration 
As in other NMS, a land retrocession occurred after the 
revolution in Romania. According to standard theory, the 
development of private property implies productivity and 
increasing growth (Amblard,[5]). Approximately 9.1 million 
ha were given back to 5 million land owners (Dumitru and 
al., [6]), but the allocation was not optimal. 
Actually,   several   new   landowners   did   not   have 
professional abilities nor were located near the land.  The 
formal right to exchange land assets on a market was 
granted in 1998 (law n° 54/1998) (Amblard [5]). According 
to Dumitru and al. [6] the land market concerned only 3.1% 
of the total agricultural area from 1999 to 2004. 
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Graph 1 : Farm Structure organization by status and size
* farms using agricultural area; UAA : Utilized Agricultural Area 
Source : ASA 2005 (INS, [7])
Until 1998 therefore, the general structure did not change 
significantly small structures remaining the rule. Economic 
literature assumes that land market imperfection is partially 
responsible for the present freeze in land allocation through 
the   market.  Ciaian   and   Swinnen   identify   land   market 
imperfection   as   due   to   transaction   costs   (Ciaian   and 
Swinnen, [8]).  Amblard assumes that the real share of 
exchanged land is much higher and that informal contracts 
are preferred to formal ones in order to save notarial and 
registration costs (Amblard, [5]).
According   to   the   Farm   Structure   Survey   of   2005, 
Romanian farm structure appears to be dual (Graph 1) with 
a large number of farms on very small plots (an average of 
2.15 ha) and a few farms ranging widely in terms of land 
area (an average of 263 ha). More than 4 million individual 
holders currently cultivate 65.5% of the total agricultural 
surface and only 18,000 having legal status occupy the other 
34.5%.
In  this paper  we  analyze the  existence of financial 
preferences with and without the life annuity program, for a 
particular region, the village of Ganesti in the Mures region, 
and at a particular period, the summer of 2007. 
B. Implementation of a life annuity program and its 
apparent failures 
In spite of the belief that redistribution, and thus private 
property,   would   be   a   leverage   for   change   in   the 
modernization of agriculture, surveys and censuses showed 
that the sector still faced enormous problems on the road to 
modernization.   Next,   the   Romanian   government 
implemented policies to stimulate the land market and thus 
encourage better land allocation. The implementation of a 
life annuity program in 2005 (law no. 247 of 19
th July 2005, 
implemented 27
th  December 2005 with publication of the 
methodological norms) was one of these policies. It aims to 
facilitate land market operation but also to stimulate a 
decrease in the number of people (especially older people) 
working in agriculture. 
The amount of the subsidy was calculated on the basis of 
2 studies and adapted by the government under budget 
constraints :
Alexandri,  [9]  tended to equalize the pension of the 
former members of the agricultural production cooperatives 
(who are the main landowners) to the pension of the 
workers   of   other   industries.   So,   she   recommended   an 
additional life annuity subsidy of 240 euros/year for farmers 
who gave up their land by selling or renting it on a long 
term contract.
Dumitru and al, [6], assumed that elderly people would 
cease farming and in so doing would release the land for 
larger   commercial   farming   units,   provided   that   they 
obtained a pension or pension benefits equal to or more than 
the income they drew from subsistence farming. They 
calculated   the   present   income   from   a   farm   as   being 
300€/ha/year. 
Finally, the eligibility conditions were defined as being 
over 62 years old, owning land surface totaling not more 
than 10 ha. They have to lease or sell all their land but can 
keep 0.5 ha for self-consumption purposes. The amount of 
indemnity per hectare was fixed at 100 euros per year in the 
case of a sale and 50 euros per year in the case of leasing 
until the death of the landowner. The life annuity program is 
a structural policy tool according to definition formulated 
by Allaire and Daucé [10] : it acts on the dynamics of the 
structure and results from the reality of obstacles to land 
mobility and to the professional mobility of farmers. 
According to the General Census in Agriculture, the 
targeted   population  numbers  almost  1.9  million  people 
(INS[11]). In fact, the first results show a disappointing 
number of applications : 55,000 cumulated applications as 
of March 2008. Another important finding of this first 
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investigation is that a large proportion of landowners chose 
to lease their land : an average of 85% of the land is 
disposed of under a leasing contract, whereas only 15% of 
landowners decided that selling their land was the more 
interesting option.
In trying to understand these results by means of a field 
survey, we pinpointed the following obstacles :
 inadequate information : the agents responsible for its 
implementation did not have the means to promote the 
program successfully
 property rights are still not clarified in several cases, and 
people cannot prove their ownership
 transaction costs for the selling contract option have 
been identified as the main obstacle in the development 
of the land market
 complex transmissions rules
C. Methodology : Net Present Value calculation 
In order to make possible a comparison of present profit 
on the land (and the expected profit for the next years) and 
the potential land price through a sale, we used a  Net 
Present Value (NPV). This enables the comparison between 
monetary amounts at different dates. 
We used the  Net Present Value  to compare farmers’ 
choices : to pursue agricultural activity, to lease or to sell, 
with separate dates for the benefits. Land sale implies a 
fresh amount of money available to spend or to be invested 
at the current interest rate, while pursuit of the activity 
implies a regular amount of money or savings on everyday 
food products for the household. 
Equation 1
1 : Net Present Value calculation 
Equation 2 : Calculation of PVA, t≠ infinite
If NPV > 0 the agent is better off selling
If NPV<0 the agent is better off selling or leasing than 
pursuing the activity.
 i is the interest rate at which the agent can hope to invest 
his money. At the time of the survey, the interest rate 
1 With NPV : Net Present Value; SV : Sale Value; PVA (or PVL) : 
Present Value when pursuing the activity or when the land is leased
was 8 % for an account in the local currency (lei). 
 R is the annual profit from activity/ ownership. Land 
profitability was evaluated by means of a field survey. 
The survey showed that a majority of landowners work 
with a contract service : people who owned a tractor did 
most of the work. 
 t is the time period over which it is planned to pursue 
the activity. It represents the amortization period for an 
investment. In  the case of  pursuing the activity or 
ownership of the land, it can be considered as the time 
people  thought  they  would live, or how long they 
planned   to   maintain   agricultural   activity.   Based   on 
Walras analysis, we chose an infinite time step for the 
calculation of PVA (Walras 1880, quote by Guigou, 
[12]), which become equal to R/i. This is corroborated 
by different empirical studies, where it's assumed that 
the land is a security net for the difficult employment 
context   and   low   pensions   (Von   Hirschhausen,   [13], 
Darrot and Mouchet, [14]).
D. Margin calculation for the different production systems 
and estimation of land market price for the same period
In order to better understand why the measure has not 
worked, we conducted a field survey in a village : Ganesti 
in the Judet of Mures. 
We adopted a comprehensive approach, based on the 
concrete situation. We chose a region which is not too 
specialized, nor too involved in tourism for this survey. 
Unemployment is still high in the area and a lot of people 
have returned to the village near the town (around 30,000 
inhabitants). We interviewed  35 people chosen from the 
registry of agriculture at the local level.
Our subjects were all over 62 years old and owned at 
least 0,5 ha of arable land. None of them were engaged in 
the life annuity program although 2 had heard about it, but 
were not very well informed of the modalities. Moreover, 
17 people had partially anticipated the transmission of their 
land, in 11 cases by giving over the management to a family 
member and in 6 cases by an official leasing act with an 
exterior party. 
We identified that the land outside the village (classified 
as   agricultural   land)   is   used   for   purposes   of   cereal 
production : principally corn and wheat. Beet sugar and 
potato production exists as well, but rarely outside the 
village. Production distribution is almost 1/3 for wheat and 
2/3 for corn. Production is mainly used for consumption by 
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the farmers themselves, as flour for bread or feed for pigs 
and poultry yard animals. We identified for this region and 
during   this   period,   4   modalities   of   production   in   the 
system :
 the farmer owns the land he works and possesses a 
tractor
 the land is worked under a service agreement, where the 
landowner still makes decisions concerning production 
but externalizes the main tasks such as plowing, seeding 
and harvesting for wheat but not for corn
 leasing with a good contract
*: 500kg of wheat / ha/year 
 leasing with a weak contract : 250kg of wheat /ha/year; 
this is a situation of “reverse tenancy”
* As of 1998 the term and the amount of the leasing contract are free and 
have to be negotiated between the parties. In the village there are two 
major farms asking for leasing contracts, at two different prices. 
** “Reverse tenancy” defined by Amblard [5]) concern the situation where 
the land owner own a small amount of land and the tenant is a big farmer 
using largely leasing to access the land. In this case tenants dominated the 
negotiation on the rental contract to the small land owners. 
We estimated the margin as the substitute income, the 
production   price   for   raw   products   minus   production 
charges.  As   the   major   purpose   of   production   is   self-
consumption   and   animal   breeding,   we   compared   the 
production to the price that farmers would pay in the village 
from a local seller. During this period, on the local market, 
wheat and corn were selling for almost 200€/t. We did not 
take into account land tax (almost 10€/ha), nor subsidies 
(between 30€/ha for the national subsidy last year and 
50€/ha expected for next year counting additional European 
Subsidies). The village studied is situated in a hilly region 
appropriate for vineyards. Land prices have evolved quickly 
in the past years.
Due to speculation in vineyard land and inflation, prices 
have increase from 150€/ha up to an average of 1000€/ha 
that we chose as Sale Value (SV) in our calculation. 
Table 1  : Yearly margin of agricultural production and Present Value of Activity (PVA)
1 ha for 1 year (in Euros) Service agreement Tractor owners
Corn margin  320 to 920  500 to 1100 
Wheat margin -100 to 500   120 to 720 
Global margin with 70% corn, 30% wheat 194 to 794 386 to 986
Present Value of Activity (PVA) i=8%, t = ∞ 2425 to 9925 4825 to 12 325
Table 2 : Rent benefice and Present Value of Rent and Life Annuity program
1 ha for 1 year (in Euros) Lease 250 kg/ha Lease 500kg/ha Life Annuity/ leasing Life Annuity /selling
Rent value 50 100 50 100
Present Value of Leasing (PVL) or of 
Life Annuity subsidy (PVLA)
2 
625 1250 552 1105
 
E. Effect of life annuity program on option opportunities 
In this specific market context, we would know what his 
the life annuity program on the financial opportunity to 
lease or sell the land. Table 3 on next page, shows that at the 
present amount, the life annuity program reinforces the 
rental option and the selling option only when the previous 
situation was already leasing. 
When people were engaged personally or through service 
agreements   in   agricultural   work,   there   is   no   financial 
incentive to sell. 
This   explains   why   a   majority   of   life   annuity 
subscriptions occur under a leasing contract. The decision to 
sell is motivated by elements other than the incentive of the 
subsidy. 
The table 3 also allows us to calculate the level of the life 
annuity program, at which selling would be financially 
speaking advantageous. In case of a service agreement, the 
proposition made by Alexandri [9]) at 240€/ha would be 
sufficient,  whereas   for  tractor  owners,  at   least  amount 
suggested by Dumitru and al, [6] would be necessary.
In conclusion, at its present state of development, the life 
annuity   program   has   failed   in   its   objective   of   land 
liberation. This is so because landowners who already lease 
their property gain under the program by continuing to lease 
or   by  selling.   But   leasing   is   a  temporary  and   fragile 
situation due to a weak rental law (no minimal terms for 
2 PVLA is calculated with the optimistic option. We used the life expectancy of a woman of 62 years old, or 28 years for the present value calculation 
(INS [15]). 
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contracts) but also because rental contracts become null  when the land owner dies and the heirs want to farm 
Table 3 : Net Present Value for 1ha, village of Ganesti, Mures County
In Euros (1) PVA* (2) SV (3) SV+PVLA NPV =(1)-(2) NPV with PVLA
=(1)-(3)
Individual Farming
with service agreement  2425 to 9925 1000 2105 -1425 to -8925 -320 to -7820
as tractor owner  4825 to 12 325 1000 2105 -3825 to -11325 -2720 to -10220
Externalization of the production
Lease at 250kg wheat /ha/year 625 1000 2105 375 1480
Lease at 500kg wheat /ha/year 1250 1000 2105 -250 855
Lease at 250kg wheat /ha/year with life annuity program  625 + 552= 1177 1000 2105 -177 928
Lease at 500kg wheat /ha/year with life annuity program 1250+552= 1802 1000 2105 -802 303
the land themselves.  It will remembered that one of the 
objectives of the policy was to release the land in a more 
permanent fashion.
CONCLUSIONS
According to Ciaian and Swinnen, [8], the land market and 
the land rental market are marked by failures in Romania. 
The life annuity program was implemented in order to 
compensate for these failures among other things. Using 
empirical data from a field survey, we have demonstrate in 
this paper that the amount of the subsidy is not high enough 
to achieve the desired objectives. The use of a Net Present 
Value   calculation   demonstrates   that,   based   on   strictly 
financial   motivations,  the  subsidy does   not  sufficiently 
compensate the profit earned by a landowner working his 
land with his own tractor or by delegation to a tractor 
operator. Nevertheless, the policy reinforces the interest of 
leasing contracts and incites landowners who previously 
leased their land to sell it. 
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